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The Navy’s current inventory and requisition management procedures for issuing repair 
parts onboard ships have remained relatively unchanged for decades. As a result of 
current practices, many ships are experiencing higher average customer wait times 
(ACWT) for repair parts onboard ship. The U.S. Navy has identified the need to reduce 
this wait time in order to complete shipboard repairs faster and increase readiness levels 
across the fleet. Applying a six sigma define, measure, analyze, improve and control 
(DMAIC) process approach, this report describes current procedures from initial demand 
to issue of repair parts, including collecting and analyzing quantitative and qualitative 
data. Recommendations and conclusions are offered to improve the overall process, 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii




1.  Business Management .........................................................................4 
2.  Quality Control ....................................................................................5 
3.  Information Technology ......................................................................6 








D.  SHIPS AND ASSIGNED PERSONNEL .......................................................9 
E.  AFLOAT TRAINING GROUP PACIFIC ..................................................10 
F.  COMMANDER NAVAL SURFACE FORCE PACIFIC ..........................11 
G.  NAVAL SEA LOGISTICS CENTER ..........................................................12 
III.  INVENTORY PROCEDURES .................................................................................13 
A.  DEPOT LEVEL REPAIRABLES ................................................................13 
B.  AVERAGE CUSTOMER WAIT TIME (ACWT)......................................15 
C.  LOGISTICS RESPONSE TIME (LRT) ......................................................16 
1.  Requisition Submission Time ...........................................................16 
2.  Inventory Control Point Processing Time .......................................16 
3.  Depot Processing Time ......................................................................16 
4.  Transportation Time .........................................................................16 
5.  Receipt Take-Up Time .......................................................................17 
D.  NAVAL TACTICAL COMMAND SUPPORT SYSTEM .........................17 
1.  Operational Maintenance Management System–Next 
Generation ..........................................................................................17 
2.  RSUPPLY ...........................................................................................18 
IV.  DEFINING THE PROBLEM ...................................................................................19 
A.  CURRENT STATE ........................................................................................19 








V.  MEASURING THE PROBLEM ..............................................................................23 
A.  ESTABLISHING A BASELINE ..................................................................23 
B.  LOGISTICS PROCESS ................................................................................23 
C.  OMMS–NG .....................................................................................................24 
D.  RSUPPLY CY04 ............................................................................................28 
E.  RSUPPLY VIKING .......................................................................................33 
F.  DATA ..............................................................................................................37 
VI.  ANALYZING THE PROBLEM ..............................................................................49 
A.  OARS AND CMP MATCHING DATA ......................................................49 
1.  Hypothesis #1 ......................................................................................49 
2.  Hypothesis #2 ......................................................................................51 
VII.  IMPROVING AND CONTROLING THE PROBLEM ........................................55 
A.  INTRODUCTION TO IMPROVEMENTS ................................................55 
B.  IMPROVEMENT #1 .....................................................................................55 
C.  IMPROVEMENT #2 .....................................................................................56 
D.  IMPROVEMENT #3 .....................................................................................56 
E.  IMPROVEMENT #4 .....................................................................................57 
F.  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................57 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................59 




LIST OF FIGURES 
  Business Process Management Evolution .........................................................4 Figure 1.
  CY04 Identification Number ...........................................................................14 Figure 2.
  Viking Identification Number ..........................................................................14 Figure 3.
  Operational Availability ...................................................................................16 Figure 4.
  NTCSS Database .............................................................................................17 Figure 5.
  Logistics Subsystem Menu in RSupply ...........................................................18 Figure 6.
  Fishbone Diagram ............................................................................................20 Figure 7.
  OMMS Swim Lane Chart ................................................................................26 Figure 8.
  CY04 RSupply Swim Lane Chart ....................................................................29 Figure 9.
  Requirements Review Menu ............................................................................31 Figure 10.
  DD Form 1348–1A Issue Request Form .........................................................32 Figure 11.
  Viking Swim Lane Chart .................................................................................34 Figure 12.
  CMP Stop Light Chart .....................................................................................38 Figure 13.
  OARS Descriptive Statistics in Hours .............................................................39 Figure 14.
  Defect Rate Calculation ...................................................................................40 Figure 15.
  Ship 1 ...............................................................................................................40 Figure 16.
  Ship 2 ...............................................................................................................41 Figure 17.
  Ship 3 ...............................................................................................................42 Figure 18.
  Ship 4 ...............................................................................................................43 Figure 19.
  Ship 5 ...............................................................................................................44 Figure 20.
  Ship 6 ...............................................................................................................45 Figure 21.
  Ship 7 ...............................................................................................................46 Figure 22.
  Combined Data ................................................................................................47 Figure 23.
  Matching Data in Days ....................................................................................50 Figure 24.
  Distribution of Average Customer Wait Time .................................................51 Figure 25.
  Original Matching OARS and CMP Data .......................................................52 Figure 26.
  Matching OARS and CMP Data Without Outliers ..........................................53 Figure 27.
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
2M   Miniature/Microminiature 
ACWT  Average Customer Wait Time 
APL   Allowance Parts Listing 
ASI   Automated Shore Interface 
ATG   Afloat Training Group 
BMD   Ballistic Missile Defense 
BPM   Business Process Management 
CMP   Continuous Monitoring Program 
COMNAVSURFOR  Commander Naval Surface Forces 
DD   Department of Defense 
DDG   Guided Missile Destroyer 
DLATS  Defense Logistics Agency Transaction Services 
DLR   Depot Level Repairable 
DMAIC  Define Measure Analyze Improve Control 
ICP   Inventory Control Point 
IT   Information Technology 
LCPO   Leading Chief Petty Officer 
LS   Logistics Specialists 
MBA   Masters of Business Administration 
MDT   Mean Down Time 
MTBM  Mean Time Between Maintenance 
NAVSUP  Naval Supply Systems Command 
NC Not Carried 
NIS Not in Stock 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
NRFI Non Ready for Issue 
NSLC Naval Sea Logistics Center 
NSN National Stock Number 
NTCSS Naval Tactical Command Support System 
NWCF Navy Working Capital Fund 
 xii
OARS Open Architecture Retrieval System 
OMMS NG Organizational Maintenance Management System Next Generation 
ONBD Onboard 
OPTAR Operational Target 
PUK Pack-Up Kit 
QPA Quantity per Allowance 
RFI Ready for Issue 
RIP Remain in Place 
RPPO Repair Parts Petty Officer 
RSupply Relational Supply 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
SPAWAR Space Warfare Command 
SRF Stock Record File 
SUPPO Supply Officer 
TYCOM Type Commander 
UI Unit of Issue 








LCDR Pamela R. Saucedo, SC, USN, would like to thank her husband, David Randy 
Saucedo, and children, Ariella and Austin, for their continued support and patience over 
the last 18 months. Without their tremendous love and full understanding, the completion 
of this thesis would not have been possible.  
 
LCDR Andrew Phillips, SC, USN, would like to thank his wife, Maryam, for her 
continued support of his decision to serve proudly in the United States Navy. The 
devotion and understanding of our families has been a driving force for us to excel while 
at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
  
We would also like to thank major contributors of information:  Naval Sea Logistics 
Center; Commanding Officer, CAPT Drapp, Executive Officer, CDR Cabral, and subject 
matter expert, Kirsten Bitner, Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific, Afloat Training 
Group, and Continuous Monitoring Program analyst, Mark Dexter for their generous 
support, insight, and assistance during our project.  
 
Additionally, we would like to thank the Acquisition Research Program, RADM James 
Greene, USN (Ret), Ms. Karey Shaffer, and Ms. Tera Yoder, for providing resources to 
ensure the success of this MBA project. 
 
Finally, we would like to especially thank Professors Geraldo Ferrer and Michael Dixon 
for their time, support, and encouragement. Your guidance and mentorship was 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION  
In support of national security and maritime interests, the United States Navy 
maintains a large surface force to perform current and future missions, including 
projecting power, deterring aggression, and maintaining freedom of the seas. In order to 
keep this fleet materially and operationally ready to perform these critical missions, the 
Navy must maximize the effective use of its resources to maintain the highest levels of 
readiness as well as ensure its ships achieve their expected service lives. As the senior 
ranking officer in the Department of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) is 
responsible for fleet readiness as well as the operating efficiency of naval forces. In fact, 
of the CNO’s top three tenets concerning the United States Navy, warfighting is first. As 
he explains, “The Navy has to be ready to fight and prevail today, while building the 
ability to win tomorrow. This is our primary mission and all our efforts must be grounded 
in this fundamental responsibility” (“CNO’s Tenets,” 2013). 
A large part of this warfighting capability is directly dependent upon the quality 
of organizational maintenance being performed at the shipboard level to reduce the 
number of system casualties. In other words, the fewer systems that are down or 
degraded, the greater capability and lethality a ship can “bring to the fight.” As a result, 
shipboard personnel are responsible for quickly identifying those systems that require 
corrective maintenance, taking action to ensure they document a record of maintenance 
and determine the parts needed to fix the system. By establishing a material history for 
each piece of equipment, vast improvements are achieved in maintainability and 
reliability, which ultimately result in a reduction in the cost of material ownership. In 
addition to the quality of maintenance performed, availability of spare parts and the 
amount of time it takes to deliver them to the end user play key roles in the operational 
availability of a system and, ultimately, a ship’s warfighting capability. Having limited 
quantities of repairable parts stored onboard ships is essential to ensuring there is some 
level of safety stock to address those systems that are critical for shipboard operation. For 
example, basic functionality such as maintaining propulsion, keeping weapons systems 
online, or simply making water is essential when steaming in remote parts of the world. 
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Keeping these systems online at all times requires not only due diligence from the crew, 
but also rapid turnaround times for the delivery of spare parts for correcting material 
discrepancies.  
Based on our personal experiences as department heads afloat, we have intimate 
knowledge of many of the logistical policies and procedures surrounding the onboard 
issue of depot level repairable (DLR) parts. Given this experience, we have noticed many 
of the business rules or procedures currently practiced have led to inefficiencies or 
created additional work requirements that result in wasted time and money for the Navy. 
While developing a strategy concerning our thesis, we identified various commercial 
business practices that could assist us in gaining efficiencies in the delivery of repair parts 
onboard ship. 
We utilize these concepts learned at the Naval Postgraduate School to review all 
aspects of current logistical management practices for delivering parts afloat in order to 
seek efficiencies and reduce average customer wait time for the end user. Furthermore, 
we evaluate whether the opportunity exists to leverage current technologies and practices 
in order to reduce the manpower involved or eliminate redundant steps in the process, 
resulting in shorter wait times and improved overall warfighting capability for U.S. Navy 
surface combatants. 
Our objective for this thesis is to review current business practices and processes 
concerning the Navy’s logistical operation afloat, specifically ways to gain efficiencies 
and reduce average customer wait time (ACWT) for delivery of onboard repair parts. As 
such, we focus our attention on the software used to process the demand for material, 
examine procedural guidance governing this process, and map the computer and human 
interaction required to physically deliver the part to the end user. At the conclusion of our 
project, we offer recommendations to improve shipboard logistic operations and reduce 




Although there is a large body of work surrounding business process 
management, we decided to summarize a collection of leading authors and theorists to 
best capture a concise literature review of this topic. As a result, the following summary 
is paraphrased from several sources concerning business process management. 
Considered the father of scientific management, Frederick W. Taylor was a 
pioneer in the study of the efficiency movement, which has evolved into today’s business 
process management (BPM). His focus on time/motion studies concerning manufacturing 
tasks became a revolutionary system for maximizing profits where efficiency and cost 
minimization were the primary business drivers. During this time, business functions 
were stove-piped and organizations would train their workers to follow specific steps that 
required little skill and repeat them over and over. Controls were put into place to 
regulate process drivers, and this resulted in much higher production levels. As a result of 
these efforts, the value of work standardization continues to remain a basis for many of 
our business processes today.  
As time progressed, so did the evolution of business process management.  
In the 1960s, technology increasingly became a business driver and 
amplified the speed of change. This launched the first wave of process 
orientation. International (Japanese) companies became much more 
competitive, due, in part, to their focus on quality improvement programs 
and reduced defects. U.S. companies started to mirror the quality 
approach. The combination of process scrutiny and technological 
superiority led to the consideration of technology as process driver. 
American business changed its operational paradigm, and the process era 
began. American business scrutiny of international competition changed 
focus to measurable processes and to speed that could be combined into 
“Just in time” manufacturing. The growing use of computers in the 1970s 
and 80s combined with procedure specialization that accommodated 
technological precision in fields such as nuclear power, led to quantitative 
statistical software and related data gathering techniques that measured, 
gathered, and interpreted results. (Lusk, Paley, & Spanyi, 2005, p. 4) 
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As a result of this evolution, three distinct business process types emerged, as shown in 
Figure 1: business management, quality control, and information technology. 
 
 Business Process Management Evolution Figure 1. 
1. Business Management  
Business management is based in generic concepts surrounding the basics of 
business, including marketing, finance, and corporate vision rather than improvement in 
production or quality. In the 1980s, the United States began to lose market share in 
manufacturing to foreign competitors who focused on improving operations as a part of a 
grand business strategy. Producing large quantities, as the U.S. was accustomed to doing 
post–World War II, was no longer competitive in a global market. As a result, BPM took 
on a different role that focused on aligning all facets of a business into a greater corporate 
strategy in which the firm’s success was tied to the success of work performed by 
managers and their employees. In this light, business management suggests that every 
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process or activity must be managed and measured to ensure maximum performance for 
each subset of the firm. Management figures like Michael Porter also expanded on the 
idea of business management by arguing that “strategy was intimately linked with how 
companies organized their activities into value chains, which were, in turn, the basis for a 
company’s competitive advantage” (Porter, 1985, p. 34). This management practice 
broke down each activity of a company into either a core competency or a supporting role 
where achieving the best fit would determine the level of competitive advantage. As long 
as these activities are arranged in “proper” sequence and managers maintain a watchful 
eye on their own value scorecards, then a firm’s degree of success will improve. 
2. Quality Control 
The quality control method is a continuation of the work simplification rooted in 
the work of Taylor, addressing the most efficient way to perform a task. This 
methodology proved significant with the innovation of Henry Ford’s moving production 
line, which drastically cut down production time and unit cost. In fact, Ford was able to 
sell cars at such a low cost that every middle-class American could afford a car. Workers 
would begin assembling an automobile at one end of the factory while completing 
assembly of the final product at the other end. According to Harmon (2010), Henry Ford 
conceptualized the development of an automobile as a single process and designed and 
sequenced each activity in the process to ensure that the entire process ran smoothly and 
efficiently (p. 39). Furthermore, as a result of his efforts, almost every other 
manufacturing process throughout the world scrambled to learn this innovation and what 
lay behind Ford’s achievement. As mobilization for war in the 1940s ramped up, the 
United States was unmatched in its industrial capability concerning mass production of 
weaponry. This played a crucial role in an Allied victory while allowing the refinement 
of efficient production techniques. As the quality control movement marched into the 
1970s, Japanese automakers expanded on the quality effort by introducing “lean” 
concepts into their production capabilities. This concept identified any effort or 
expenditure of resources that did not add value to a final product as waste and eliminated 
it from the process. In 2001, a new quality tool, Six Sigma, emerged within the business 
industry. By combining process analysis with statistical quality control techniques and a 
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program of organizational rewards, continuous process improvement was promoted to a 
level not seen before in previous attempts. In fact, General Electric CEO Jack Welsh 
mandated a company-wide Six Sigma effort by tying 40% of every executive’s bonus to 
Six Sigma results. As a result of its success, today’s managers continue to tie in the 
benefit of Lean and Six Sigma processes into their corporate strategies. 
3. Information Technology 
With the introduction of desktop computers, automation of business processes has 
greatly increased the level of productivity in today’s workplace. As a result of the 
ushering in of the Internet and web-enabled media, many basic job functions, such as 
records keeping and database management, have now expanded into global business 
applications. Processes that were once formally organized and staffed have been 
eliminated with the transition to online commerce. This allows customers to quickly 
transition from information gathering to ultimately purchasing items with a simple click 
of a button. Software development within the information technology (IT) realm has 
vastly improved computing power, thus allowing humans to analyze and solve complex 
problems in a wide variety of modeling scenarios. As a result of these developments, 
“business executives realize that there is no sharp contrast between a firm’s business 
model and what the latest technology will facilitate; IT is no longer a service—it has 
become the pillar of the company’s strategy” (Harmon, 2010, p. 51). With this in mind, a 
holistic approach should be taken into consideration when implementing IT applications 
into the business process management.	
B. LEAN SIX SIGMA APPLICATION 
This thesis represents a contribution to the study of process improvement from a 
Navy supply officer’s point of view in order to promote the reduction of wait time for 
issuing repairable parts in a shipboard environment. As such, we believe the best business 
process approach for our project is focusing on quality control and the application of 
Lean and Six Sigma concepts. 
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1. DMAIC 
The define, measure, analyze, improve, and control (DMAIC) methodology is 
considered the backbone of the Lean Six Sigma methodology for eliminating costly 
variation in business and manufacturing processes. The model uses statistical tools at 
each of its five steps; defining, measuring, analyzing, improving, and controlling to 
identify defects within a process and apply effective changes that will ultimately improve 
the entire process. A variety of statistical tools are used to briefly explain the collection of 
data, data analysis, and data presentation within the DMAIC process. 
a. Define 
Defining the problem is the first step. Defining the problem involves 
asking “What is the problem?”  Sometimes the real problem may not be very clear; 
therefore, additional steps are required to define the problem, such as creating fishbone 
diagrams. Ultimately, defining the problem leads to identifying critical steps that are 
causing variations within the scope of the problem.   
Fishbone diagrams are cause-and-effect diagrams. They represent a 
structured brainstorming analysis that identifies potential defects and hypothesizes the 
relationships between potential causes. Major categories of causes include methods, 
manpower, materials, equipment, measurements, and environment. 
b. Measure 
Measuring is the second step in the process. Understanding how the 
process works is critical in understanding how the process is measured. In order to 
measure the process, the baseline information, such as historical data, is often used to 
gain a better understanding of the events that are happening within the process. Process 
maps or flow charts help in understanding the current state of the process. 
Swim-lane charts are a form of flow charts. They can be either vertical or 
horizontal and are visual flow charts outlining sub-processes within a process. They 
outline procedural and decision points within the process, as well as visually illustrating a 
starting point and an ending point for the process.  
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c. Analyze 
Analyzing the data is the third step in the process. What are probable 
causes contributing to the problem?  Statistical information attained from the analysis of 
data collected during the measurement phase provides insights for the sources of 
variations. Constraints in the process can be identified through formal testing of different 
hypotheses.   
d. Improve 
The improvement phase is the fourth step in the process and focuses on 
the top causes identified in the analyze phase that can be improved or eliminated to 
increase performance within the process. Once the top causes are identified, improvement 
solutions are brainstormed. It is important to develop a plan to implement and execute the 
solutions, as in a pilot program.   Once the pilot program is in place, it is critical to use an 
evaluate phase to determine if the solutions are working. This step is repeated until the 
desired goal is achieved.   
e. Control 
The control phase is the last step in the DMAIC methodology. Many agree 
this is the second-most important phase after the define phase. The control phase 
maintains those changes identified in the improve phase to guarantee process 
improvements. Change is often perceived as negative. Without consistent management of 
this phase, it is easy to revert to conducting business the previous way. Therefore, it is 
important to implement the improvements identified in the improve phase and provide a 
new process map that outlines the new procedures, as well as employee training to 
communicate the new standard practice. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
We applied concepts and theories associated with supply chain management as 
well as statistical analysis techniques we learned in our 18-month MBA curriculum. The 
sample consisted of seven U.S. Navy Destroyers that have ballistic missile defense 
(BMD) capabilities, stationed in the Pacific Fleet. Then we utilized survey methods for 
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gathering information and conducting onboard interviews as well as observing the key 
players involved in the shipboard requisition process.   
We embarked two U.S. Navy Destroyers home ported in San Diego, California. 
We conducted interviews with the supply officer, leading chief petty officer, and DLR 
custodians, while making observations concerning the issuance of DLRs. In addition, we 
electronically distributed surveys to the remaining ships based in Hawaii, Japan, or on 
deployment. The total survey respondents consisted of 28 sailors and seven officers that 
provided data concerning their respective requisition practices. 
We mapped the requisition process with subject-matter experts at the Afloat 
Training Group (ATG), which is responsible for training shipboard personnel on IT 
systems used for ordering and issuing parts. Finally, we contacted Naval Sea Logistics 
Center and Commander Naval Surface Force commands, which provided sources of data 
concerning ACWT to compare with our human observations. 
D. SHIPS AND ASSIGNED PERSONNEL 
Shipboard personnel responsible for the process of fulfilling demand for DLR 
parts are called logistics specialists (LSs). Onboard ship, they fall under the departmental 
supervision of a commissioned officer of the U.S. Navy Supply Corps and the 
organization known as the Supply Department. LSs play a key role in the DLR request 
process by ensuring requests for parts are properly submitted, are compliant with 
technical specifications, and are issued in a timely manner to meet operational 
requirements. They use a computer database know as Relational Supply (RSupply) to 
process these demand requests, track inventory, and maintain financial accountability of 
operational target (OPTAR) funds. In addition to these requirements, LSs also perform 
daily duties such as procurement, receipt, and stowage of shipboard parts. We conducted 
extensive research concerning the time it takes a DLR part that is available in the ship’s 
inventory to reach the end user who originally created the demand.  
We sat down with each LS responsible for issuing DLR parts in order for them to 
walk us through every step of the DLR request process, including the electronic input 
required by RSupply and the human action involved in delivering the repair part to the 
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end user. We asked questions at each step of the process to clarify any ambiguity 
concerning the reasoning for starting or stopping action at a particular step. We utilized a 
digital device to record each step verbally and took screen shots of each step within 
RSupply. After recording the process, we held physical interviews with every LS in order 
to ask questions about the DLR request process from their personal experience. Our 
analysis was extensive and provided answers to the following questions: 
 What was the average level of experience for logistics specialists onboard? 
 How many steps were required to satisfy demand from stock to end user? 
 How long did each step in the process take? 
 How many steps were required within RSupply to issue a part? 
 How long did each step of the process take in RSupply? 
 How many steps were required outside of RSupply that involved human 
action? 
 How many people were involved in the human action? 
 How would you improve the DLR process in order to reduce ACWT? 
We also conducted physical interviews with each supply officer concerning the 
DLR request process to gain a supervisory perspective. 
E. AFLOAT TRAINING GROUP PACIFIC 
The Afloat Training Group (ATG) Pacific provides training for the fleet 
combatants in order to evaluate their level of mission readiness. In addition, it provides 
learning centers and classroom instruction for all shipboard procedures as well as 
guidance on the latest naval instructions, directives, and publications. We contacted 
senior-level LSs and RSupply subject-matter experts based in San Diego to conduct 
interviews concerning the requisition process. We wanted to ensure they understood the 
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rules and regulations surrounding the requisition process and to identify the Navy 
publications, instructions, and shipboard policies that governed the process. We gathered 
information on proper procedures a request for repairable parts should follow as well as 
the necessary signature authorities involved and the publications that govern the process. 
F. COMMANDER NAVAL SURFACE FORCE PACIFIC 
The Commander Naval Surface Force (COMNAVSURFOR), Pacific, is the type 
commander (TYCOM) for all surface vessels in the Pacific fleet. The force provides 
operational commanders with highly skilled and well-trained sailors to operate 
sophisticated and state-of-the-art surface vessels. It provides seasoned technical expertise 
in all facets of surface combatants. In regards to supply operations, COMNAVSURFOR 
provides guidance and subject-matter expertise in financial management and inventory 
control procedures. 
COMNAVSURFOR maintains the Continuous Monitoring Program (CMP). The 
CMP is a highly utilized tool that monitors the health of a ship’s supply department 
metrics. The CMP extractor retrieves real-time data from surface ships in regards to 
supply, food service, and ship store divisions. According to COMNAVSURFORINST 
4400.1 (Commander, Naval Surface Forces, 2008), the CMP website is continuously 
viewed by the type commanders, CLASSRONs, and ATGs to monitor ship performance 
and data trends. Based on the data trends for a particular ship, ATG will offer assistance 
and training to correct any discrepancies. Ships will use the CMP website to review data 
trends, obtain the latest extractor software, view current DLR carcass charge data, and 
respond to data calls by COMNAVSURFOR. 
We obtained one year of historical CMP data for all seven U.S. Navy Guided 
Missile Destroyers (DDG) with Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability home ported 
in the Pacific fleet. The CMP data provided ACWT for onboard and off-ship repairable 
and non-repairable requests and requisitions from the time a request was originally 
generated in RSupply. This information was valuable in determining ACWT for onboard 
issues of DLRs. 
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G. NAVAL SEA LOGISTICS CENTER 
Naval Sea Logistics Center (NSLC) is the premier provider of logistics and 
information technology to the U.S. Navy. NSLC serves as the Naval Sea Systems 
Command (NAVSEA) technical agent for developing, maintaining, and assessing life-
cycle logistics to provide superior, cost-effective, and innovative logistics, engineering, 
information technology, and quality assurance solutions that meet the life-cycle 
requirements of the Navy (NSLC, 2012). 
NSLC utilizes Open Architecture Retrieval System (OARS) metrics to capture 
ACWT in OMMS–NG. NSLC provided one year of historical OARS data for all seven 
U.S. Navy Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG) with BMD capability home ported in the 
Pacific fleet. OARS data is valuable because it calculates ACWT from demand created in 
OMMS to issue in RSupply. CMP data calculates ACWT from request/requisition to 
issue in RSupply. 
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III. INVENTORY PROCEDURES 
A. DEPOT LEVEL REPAIRABLES 
DLRs are repair parts that are centrally funded and managed on a fixed allowance 
by NAVSUP Weapons System Support (WSS) in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. Each 
ship’s platform type is unique and is initially outfitted with the required number of 
allowances set by the TYCOM to support mission requirements. 
Every ship is responsible for managing its DLR program via guidance from 
NAVSUP P485 and COMNAVSURFORINST 4400.1 (Naval Supply Systems 
Command, 2005a; Commander, Naval Surface Forces, 2008) to ensure the crew 
maintains strict controls and accountability of high-priced maintenance parts. The loss of 
any DLR can result in the relief of the supply officer, who is responsible for the 
shipboard DLR program. To keep this loss from happening, the supply officer maintains 
strict oversight of the program by assigning a responsible and trusted DLR custodian. The 
DLR custodian is primarily responsible for the inventory, ordering, receiving, validating, 
handling, and issuance of all DLRs. If the DLR custodian is unavailable to carry out these 
functions, the responsibility is delegated to the assistant DLR custodian. The fewer 
personnel handling DLRs, the greater the chances of maintaining 100% accountability in 
inventory validity. 
According to COMNAVSURFORINST 4400.1 (Commander, Naval Surface 
Forces, 2008), the primary objective of the DLR program is to improve availability of 
DLRs, which ultimately results in improved fleet readiness. As a result, the procurement 
authority for DLRs maintains strict requirements for shipboard supply departments that 
require a rapid turn-in of broken or non-ready-for-issue (NRFI) DLRs to shore repair 
facilities. The supply officer is responsible for ensuring compliance with these DLR 
directives and procedures relative to shipboard departmental turn-ins. The supply officer 
accomplishes this objective by implementing a comprehensive and continuous DLR 
training program for supply and maintenance personnel stressing the importance of time 
for receiving and issuing DLRs. 
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Request and requisitioning of DLRs is a complex task that is performed by LSs. 
This responsibility is normally restricted to trained and experienced LSs because it 
involves the validation and processing of high-priced repair parts. DLRs can be processed 
two ways: internally and externally. DLRs processed and issued internally onboard the 
ship are assigned an identification number. Depending on which version of RSupply a 
ship is using, this identification number will be referenced by different styles of letters 
and numbers, but they serve the same purpose. For example, if a ship utilizes version 
CY04, then the identification number, known as a request number, is displayed in the 
form of work-center, Julian date, and a sequentially assigned serial number as seen in 
Figure 2.   
   
 CY04 Identification Number Figure 2. 
If RSupply Viking is being used, then the identification number, known as a 
requisition number, will be utilized. The requisition number is composed of the ship’s 
unit identification code (UIC), Julian date, and a four-digit sequentially assigned serial 
number as seen in Figure 3. 
 
 Viking Identification Number Figure 3. 
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All DLRs are identified by an advice code. An advice code provides amplifying 
instruction on the proper handling of a part based on a hierarchy of importance. In other 
words, as parts become less available, the more valuable they become. Among the 
numerous advice codes used, the most common are 5G and 5S. 
COMNAVSURFORINST 4400.1 Appendix D (Commander, Naval Surface Forces, 
2008) defines these advice codes as follows:  
 5G: NRFI carcass will be turned in to the supply system on an exchange 
basis. 
 5S: remain-in-place (RIP) certification. NRFI carcass will be turned in to 
the supply system upon receipt of requested item. 
These advice codes serve as a cost-savings initiative, allowing ships to reduce the 
amount of funding required to purchase new repair parts by turning in NRFI for a 
discount. If a repair part is designated 5G, then it requires a one-for-one exchange at the 
time of issue from shipboard stock. If it is a 5S part, then a new part can be issued 
without requiring the NRFI at the time of exchange. There are instances when the DLR 
advice code is 5G but the maintainer insists that the NRFI carcass must remain in the 
system to prevent the entire system being inoperable. In this instance, the work center is 
required to route an RIP chit requesting the degraded part stay installed while receiving a 
new one from stock. As a result, RIP chits provide command-wide visibility while 
notifying shore-side item managers of a possible delay concerning carcass turn-in.   
B. AVERAGE CUSTOMER WAIT TIME (ACWT) 
In order to improve operational readiness, the Navy captures data points and 
tracks metrics on several key processes of the request and requisitioning cycle. ACWT is 
continuously monitored and assessed within several Department of Defense organizations 
because it provides a functional baseline for a system’s real-time operational availability 
(Ao). Defined by OPNAVINST 4441.12D (Chief of Naval Operations, 2012), ACWT is 
a comprehensive measure of the time elapsed between the customer requirement 
submission time and the time of receipt by the customer. Simply stated, ACWT is the 
time elapsed from when demand is created until the time when the part is issued to the 
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end user. As a result, ACWT impacts Ao because it determines how quickly demand is 
satisfied and a system is restored to normal operations as seen in Figure 4.  
 
 Operational Availability  Figure 4. 
C. LOGISTICS RESPONSE TIME (LRT) 
LRT is the portion of ACWT that measures the average time from the date of the 
requirement to the time the material is received by the end user. It is made up of the 
response time for off-station and off-ship processing. LRT consists of the following 
elements: requisition submission time, inventory control point (ICP) processing time, 
depot processing time, transportation time, and receipt take-up time. 
1. Requisition Submission Time 
Requisition submission time is the measure of time from the Julian date of the 
requisition to the time it is received by the Defense Logistics Agency Transaction 
Services (DLATS). 
2. Inventory Control Point Processing Time 
ICP processing time is the time from the referral by DLATS to the ICP until the 
ICP submits a referral to the depot for issue. 
3. Depot Processing Time 
Depot processing time is the time from receipt of the referral at the depot to the 
time it is shipped. 
4. Transportation Time 
Transportation time is the period of time from the date that material is inducted 
into the transportation system until the material is received at the requesting activity. 
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5. Receipt Take-Up Time  
Receipt take-up time is the time it takes the customer’s supply activity to post a 
receipt for the material and report that receipt to DLATS.  
D. NAVAL TACTICAL COMMAND SUPPORT SYSTEM 
The ship’s database that captures asset inventory—to include the DLR receipt and 
requisitioning process—is the Naval Tactical Command Support System (NTCSS). 
NTCSS is a Space and Warfare System (SPAWAR) information system program that 
provides mission support capabilities through direct visibility from afloat activities to 
ashore activities. NTCSS makes possible the management of logistics, personnel, 
material, equipment maintenance, and finances required to maintain and operate all ships 
and submarines. 
The NTCSS database supports three major applications: Relational Supply 
(RSupply), Relational Admin (RADM), and Organizational Maintenance Management 
System–Next Generation (OMMS–NG). For the purpose of this thesis, we discuss both 
RSupply and OMMS–NG, but primarily RSupply, as seen in Figure 5. 
 
 NTCSS Database  Figure 5. 
1. Operational Maintenance Management System–Next Generation 
OMMS–NG is the system utilized by work centers to record their maintenance, 
create work candidates, and order parts. Each work center is identified in the OMMS by  
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division code, for example, ER09. Once the work center identifies a system within their 
division that is degraded or broken, the work center enters a work candidate to fix the 
system. The work candidate is a serialized number assigned to the job and describes the 
failed system. Once parts are identified to fix the degraded system, the work center’s 
repair parts petty officer (RPPO) orders the parts in OMMS–NG, demand is created, and 
ACWT begins. OMMS–NG interfaces with RSupply and a request/requisition number is 
generated in RSupply.  
2. RSUPPLY 
 RSupply is the application within the NTCSS database that LSs utilize most often 
for daily operations such as ordering, receiving, and issuing parts. According to RSupply 
Unit User’s Guide NAVSUP P-732 (Naval Supply Systems Command, 2005b), the 
software was initially deployed to the fleet in 1997. In March 2005, RSupply was 
upgraded to version CY04. Since then, RSupply has undergone several software upgrades 
including the version known as Viking. Currently, 50% of the fleet is utilizing RSupply-
Viking with the goal of transitioning all ships to RSupply-Viking before the end of the 
2013 fiscal year. Both RSupply CY04 and Viking have five subsystems used to perform 
daily operations: site, inventory, logistics, financial, and query. However, for this thesis, 
we only focus on the logistics subsystem, as seen in Figure 6. A series of processes take 
place within the logistics subsystem that captures the steps from when the 
request/requisition is originally generated in RSupply. The request/requisition follows a 
series of processes that include tech edit, requirements approval, and issue. 
 
 Logistics Subsystem Menu in RSupply Figure 6. 
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IV. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
A. CURRENT STATE 
What is the problem? The defect is ACWT per month per ship. As discussed in 
Chapter II, we utilized the DMAIC methodology to assist us in identifying possible 
reasons for excessive ACWT concerning the issue of repair parts. Since ACWT is 
measured monthly per ship, we wanted to find the number of defects that violated the 
established metrics that govern this process, as well as possible causes for these defects. 
In order to answer this question, we developed a fishbone diagram to assist us in 
brainstorming potential causes that contributed to excessive ACWT. 
B. FISHBONE DIAGRAM 
We began by interviewing shipboard personnel responsible for issuing DLRs. The 
sample size consisted of 16 LSs and seven supply officers from seven separate DDG 
platforms. A series of personal interviews and electronic surveys were performed to 
gather information about the DLR process. While we asked myriad multiple-choice 
questions concerning the process itself, the most valuable responses came from open-
ended questions, focused on improving ACWT.  
Although the fishbone diagram does not necessarily define the problem, it offers 
insight into possible defects that cause the problem. Based on this approach, we 
organized these responses into the diagram, to better explain potential causes for 
increased ACWT. Figure 7 shows the organization of responses into six separate 




 Fishbone Diagram Figure 7. 
1. Machine 
Once supply personnel receive demand for parts in RSupply, they must consult 
various databases outside of RSupply to ensure the parts data are correct during the tech 
edit process. This requires additional time outside of RSupply to open and search each 
line item, one by one. Multiply this effort by hundreds of part requests on a daily basis 
and delays will become apparent. Many times, parts data may not be available in the 
shipboard OMMS database. This causes delays in both the work center’s creation of a 
work candidate, as well as the verification of parts by the supply department. If these 
configuration updates, known as automated shore interfaces (ASIs) are not current, then 
the entire DLR process will experience longer wait times as a result. Finally, ship 
connectivity continues to cause delays in the issuance of DLR parts due to a lack of 
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satellite communication or limited bandwidth for conducting parts research. Many of 
these parts databases are web-based and require a solid connection for transferring data. 
2. Manpower 
Work center personnel lack the level of experience required for properly entering 
parts data for their respective work candidates. This leads to various mistakes or the 
cancellation of parts due to a large number of errors. Department heads, responsible for 
auditing such mistakes, will many times approve work candidates to simply keep work 
moving and reduce the demand in their OMMS queue. In fact, many times a work center 
will request the wrong parts or quantity, simply to complete and push a work candidate 
through, to prove maintenance requirements are up to date. This causes a delay once the 
parts are audited by supply personnel, requiring the work center to repeat the parts entry.  
3. Management 
A ship’s schedule is always subject to change based on geographic location as 
well as world events taking place. Consequently, maintenance that was scheduled during 
an inport time frame can easily be delayed due to a change in the ship’s underway 
schedule. As a result, parts requested for that maintenance will also wait in the queue 
until the ship returns to port. While underway, a ship also requires a number of watch 
standers to operate and provide safe navigation. This means the number of personnel 
available to pick up parts or turn in carcasses is limited. As a result, parts demanded will 
sit idle, along with requests in the demand queue. Additional issues take place at the 
departmental and executive level, where leaders are more concerned about operational 
availability rather than following timely turn-in procedure for DLR parts.  
4. Method 
While entering parts data to complete a work candidate, work centers are able to 
see if a part is in stock, via the relationship between OMMS and RSupply. As a result, if 
work center personnel believe a part is in stock, they will continue to focus their efforts 
on maintenance production versus making a concerted effort to turn in a carcass and 
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receive the new part requested. In other words, there is a belief that parts in stock can 
wait on the work center, regardless of any timeline requirements.  
If a part is determined to be miniature/microminature (2M) eligible, during work 
candidate creation, work center personnel are required to attempt to fix the part before 
requesting a replacement from stock. However, based on feedback received from the 
authors’ surveys and interviews, most work centers ignore this notice, given in OMMS, 
until the supply department requests the paperwork associated with the 2M repair attempt 
at the time of carcass turn-in. At this point, the 2M repair must be attempted while the 
ACWT continues to elapse. Compounding this issue is the backlog of 2M parts waiting 
on repair onboard ship or at the regional maintenance facility. 
Finally, a general lack of knowledge and training was evident concerning correct 
turn-in procedures for DLRs and 2M items for shipboard work centers.  
5. Material 
Identification of parts is sometimes laborious due to missing nameplate data on 
installed systems. This requires additional time for consulting tech manuals or contacting 
other ships with the same system to identify the part(s) required to make the repair. This 
slows down work candidate production as well as increases ACWT. Finally, depending 
on the skill level of work center personnel, many times, what was thought to be a simple 
repair may require outside assistance. This causes a pause in the issuance of repair parts 
demanded, while waiting on technical assistance. 
6. Measurement 
Ambiguity still exists concerning the best way to measure ACWT. Based on two 
different sets of guidance, there are consequently, two different metrics that measure it. 
Based on the responses given during the authors’ interviews, supply personnel suggest 
that work center personnel are not held to the same ACWT standard or metric, which 
causes a type of natural tension concerning the DLR process. As a result, only one party 
is held accountable for ACWT, while the other continues to focus on a different set of 
administrative priorities.  
 23
V.  MEASURING THE PROBLEM 
A. ESTABLISHING A BASELINE 
In order to properly measure the problem, we established a baseline understanding 
of the business rules that govern the issuance of DLRs. In addition, we created a process 
map to include both human and computer actions required to complete this action as it 
takes place in OMMS and both versions of RSupply. By utilizing this type of 
measurement, we were able to break the problem down into smaller pieces for closer 
analysis.  
B. LOGISTICS PROCESS 
DLR parts require a one-for-one turn-in known as a carcass during the 
procurement process. Hence, a work center cannot request a DLR unless it is directly in 
support of a maintenance action. As a result, this increases flexibility in procurement 
funding because DLRs function on a two-tier pricing system. Each DLR has a net price 
and a standard price. When procuring a DLR and a carcass turn-in is available, the 
procuring entity obligates funds at the net price. However, if a carcass turn-in is not 
provided because the repair part was lost, misplaced, or destroyed, the procuring activity 
will obligate funds at the standard price. The difference between the net price and 
standard price for DLRs can range from a few hundred dollars to thousands of dollars. 
Hence, it is extremely important to have strict inventory controls over DLRs.  
To determine whether or not a DLR can be issued from stock without a turn-in, 
LS personnel much check the advice code for each part. An advice code is a two-digit 
alphanumeric code that tells the LS what type of DLR is being ordered.  
Due to their high monetary value, DLRs are highly visible repair parts that are 
governed by several instructions. Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP, 2005a) 
provides naval supply procedures in Volume I of the P485 publication that establishes 




part D” establishes DLR procedures for requisitioning quantities, pricing, procurement, 
transfers, carcass turn-in procedures, issues, inventory adjustment, stock record cards, 
allowances, and inventory control. 
COMNAVSURFORINST 4400.1 (Commander, Naval Surface Forces, 2008) 
provides policy and procedures for supply operations to include a detailed “DLR 
Appendix D” that establishes clear and updated guidance concerning the issue, turn-in, 
requisitioning, and inventory management of DLRs. In addition, this instruction amplifies 
and supplements previous guidance set forth in NAVSUP P485 (Naval Supply Systems 
Command, 2005a), stressing the importance of DLR training offered by ATG subject-
matter experts (SMEs). 
Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP, 2005b) P-732 provides RSupply 
user guidance to unit-level end users. This manual provides step-by-step guidance for 
LSs concerning the processing of DLRs and related supply functions within RSupply.      
NTCSS captures every step of the DLR issue process from work candidate entry 
into OMMS–NG, to parts issue in RSupply. Depending on the shipboard version of 
RSupply, CY04 or Viking, variability exists in the configuration of steps necessary to 
satisfy demand for parts.    
C. OMMS–NG 
All maintenance performed in the U.S. Navy is subject to a work standardization 
hierarchy consisting of three levels of maintenance, organizational, intermediate, and 
depot-level. As a result, different levels of maintenance fall into a work breakdown 
structure that best aligns to the various levels and capabilities of naval engineering and 
logistical support. This ensures maintenance tasks are consistent with job complexity and 
the range of work to be performed. For the purpose of this thesis, we will focus only on 
the Organizational level of maintenance. 
Per OPNAV INST 4700.7K, “Organizational-level maintenance is the lowest 
maintenance level and consists of all maintenance actions within the capability of the 
ship’s force.”  More importantly, it is considered the first line of defense against small 
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defects becoming major operational problems and also promoting improvement in self-
sufficiency and self-assessment capabilities. As a result, today’s Navy is required to 
recognize, identify, and report equipment failure or symptoms of operation below 
standards during zone inspections, preventative maintenance execution, or watch 
standing activities.  
To help with this level of repair and maintenance, the U.S. Navy relies on 
software entities such as SPAWAR, to develop and maintain an evolving electronic 
database to schedule and document shipboard repairs. Typically referred to as “OMMS,” 
OMMS–NG is a subset of SPAWAR’s NTCSS suite, intended to provide shipboard 
maintenance personnel with convenient access to the latest shipboard configuration data, 
aid in the creation of work candidates, as well as provide the ability to input, order, and 
track parts.  
Figure 8 gives a visual diagram of the steps involved in OMMS including the 
human interaction required to satisfy the demand for parts to fix a broken or degraded 
system. Each step that requires human action is annotated by a number, while any 
software program functionality is annotated with a letter. If there is a step in the diagram 
that does not have a number or a letter beside it, then there is no human or computer 
action required at that point in the process. We will utilize this type of graph to explain all 
software and human action involved in the DLR issue process. 
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  OMMS Swim Lane Chart Figure 8. 
System Casualty:   
Shipboard systems are complex and require constant monitoring by qualified 
personnel in order to maintain optimal operation. As a result, U.S. Navy ships are 
physically organized into spaces with groups of people assigned to those spaces and 
equipment in them. These groups of people are commonly referred to as work centers. 
This organizational structure ensures every piece of equipment or system onboard 
receives required maintenance as well as minimizes any ambiguity concerning ownership 
of a specific piece of equipment. Once a system becomes degraded or inoperable, an 
investigation into the casualty takes place. The work center responsible for repairing the 
casualty will identify the root cause for failure as well as the part or parts needed to fix 
the system.  
Work Candidate Created:   
1. Work center personnel log into the OMMS program and create a work 
candidate file to identify their specific body of work on a unique piece of equipment. 
Once the work candidate is serialized, work center personnel input data about the system 
casualty that includes a description of capability lost, equipment name, serial number, 
and priority of repair. 
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A. Each work candidate entered into OMMS is recognized by a sequence of 
numbers and letters that identify a specific ship, corresponding work center, and 
sequenced event number. OMMS will serialize each work candidate so that the candidate 
is easily recognized by work center personnel for future reference.  
Parts Data Entered:   
2. Work center personnel consult tech manuals and configuration data concerning 
the broken or degraded part that caused the system failure. Once they have identified the 
correct part(s) required to fix the system, they will select the part(s) from the 
corresponding system configuration database in OMMS and include this request for parts 
under the work candidate.  
B. OMMS displays the latest database of parts associated with a system as well as 
the quantity of parts personnel are allowed to order against a single repair. This ensures 
actual demand is recorded for inventory purposes, rather than work centers creating their 
own safety stock of parts. In addition, OMMS provides amplifying information on each 
DLR requested, classifying it as miniature/microminature (2M) eligible or non-eligible. If 
a part is 2M eligible, OMMS will display a notification message during the parts request 
to let work center personnel know to follow 2M procedures before attempting to order the 
part.  
Once parts data are entered under a work candidate, average customer wait time 
starts. 
Shipboard Repair:  
3. If a part is 2M eligible, then an attempt to repair the part must be performed 
before a new part is issued from stock. This procedure avoids dollars wasted on ordering 
a new part as well as increases shipboard readiness.  
Department Head Approval:   
4. Once a work candidate is complete, it must be reviewed by the senior officer in 
charge of that work center. This officer, known as the department head, is required to 
review all work candidates in order to screen them for accuracy and validity. If a work 
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candidate is deemed to be correct, the department head will approve the work candidate 
in OMMS. If incorrect, the department head will correct the errors, notify the work center 
to make corrections, or cancel the work candidate completely. 
C. OMMS organizes each work candidate by work center and displays the list of 
work candidates ready for review under the department head access.  
Request / Requisition Number Assigned: 
D. Once the department head approves a work candidate, OMMS will interface 
with RSupply to assign an identification number to each part listed under a work 
candidate. Depending on which version of RSupply a ship is using, this identification 
number will be referenced by a different type of number, but all numbers serve the same 
purpose. The CY04 version of RSupply assigns a request number, while Viking assigns a 
requisition number. At this point, work candidates and their associated request for parts 
are visible to supply personnel who are responsible for managing this demand inside of 
RSupply.  
D. RSUPPLY CY04 
Figure 9 gives a visual representation of the steps involved in RSupply CY04 as 
well as the human interaction required to satisfy the demand for parts to fix a broken or 









E. The item verification file is the first step in RSupply after the department head 
approves the work candidate and a request number is assigned in OMMS–NG. This is an 
automated process that validates the part(s) demanded against the stock record file (SRF) 
built into RSupply. This assures the right part is ordered for the correct corresponding 
system, avoiding unnecessary costs for ordering the wrong parts. In addition to proper 
identification, CY04 will check the quantity of a specific part requested in a work 
candidate so that it does not exceed the quantity required to fix the system. If the 
automated process deems the request valid, it will bypass tech edit and go directly to the 
requirements review file. However, if the request is not valid for reasons mentioned 
previously, it will go to tech edit for further item verification.   
Tech Edit 
5. Tech edit is performed on all requests that fail the initial automated item 
verification screening. At this point, the LS utilizes several parts management software 
systems outside of RSupply to verify that every category of parts data is correct. Any 
discrepancies overlooked can create defects resulting in an increase in price or greater 
quantity of parts ordered.  
Parts Cancelled 
6. Defects that cannot be corrected result in the cancellation of the requested 
part(s) by the LS in CY04. If demand is still valid, the work center will have to re-submit 
the request in OMMS–NG once again, this time using the correct information. 
F. CY04 cancels the part(s) request associated with the work candidate and 
annotates that action in an electronic transaction log. 
Requirements Review 
G. The requirements review file receives both requests that passed the automated 
item verification and requests that were corrected by LSs in tech edit. It consolidates 
these requests into a listing of all shipboard requirements. The list is broken down 
alphabetically by work center as seen in Figure 10.  
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 Requirements Review Menu Figure 10. 
DH Review  
7. The requirements review file allows authorized users to review and approve or 
delete requirements in the requirements queue. Department heads are required to review 
their associated file and approve or disapprove these requests. If the department head 
disapproves a request in requirements review, the request for part(s) is cancelled and the 
parts are deemed no longer needed.  
Issue Document Printed 
H. Once the department head approves the work candidate, RSupply will 
automatically compare the parts requested against shipboard inventory. For those parts 
that are in stock, RSupply will automatically print an issue document in the supply office, 
known as a NAVSUP DD 1348–1A; an example is shown in Figure 11.  
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  DD Form 1348–1A Issue Request Form Figure 11. 
Stock Check 
8. Once a DD 1348–1A prints, LS personnel responsible for issuing DLRs will 
conduct a physical stock check to ensure the part is onboard. Once verified onboard, the 
LS will look up the advice code for the DLR part demanded to determine if a carcass 
turn-in is required at the time of exchange.  
Carcass Turn-In 
9. If the DLR requested is 5G, the work center is required to bring the NRFI 
carcass to the DLR custodian at time of exchange. If the NRFI carcass is incorrect, the 
DLR custodian does not issue the ready-for-issue (RFI) part and the work center must 
locate the correct NRFI carcass. If the NRFI carcass is not available for turn-in, a RIP 





10. The DLR custodian retrieves the RFI DLR from the storeroom.  
 Part Issued 
11. The DLR custodian physically gives the RFI DLR to the work center. 
Work Center Receives Part   
12. The work center signs and dates the DD1348–1A to confirm receipt of the 
RFI part. 
Posting 
13. The DLR custodian manually posts the issue into RSupply. 
 I. RSupply adjusts the SRF to reflect the part was issued and ACWT stops. 
 
E. RSUPPLY VIKING 
In addition to the CY04 version of RSupply, the latest upgraded system utilized 
by the Navy is Viking.   Figure 12 gives a visual representation of the steps involved in 
Viking as well as the human interaction required to satisfy the demand for parts to fix a 




  Viking Swim Lane Chart  Figure 12. 
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Following the assignment of a requisition number in OMMS, DLR parts data 
enter into RSupply Viking where demand is managed by LSs in the supply department.  
Validity of Parts 
E. Once parts data enters into RSupply Viking, an automated process of parts 
screening takes place. Viking will compare each part demanded against an established 
SRF within Viking to ensure accurate management information and material 
identification. This assures the right part is ordered for the correct corresponding system 
avoiding unnecessary costs for ordering the wrong parts. In addition to proper 
identification, Viking will check the quantity of a specific part requested in a work 
candidate so that it does not exceed the quantity required to fix the system. If the 
automated process deems the requisition valid, it will bypass the suspense file and go 
directly to the issue file. However, if the requisition is not valid for reason mentioned 
previously, it will go to the suspense file for further action. 
Suspense File 
F. Inside of the suspense file, Viking displays a stock record file for each part 
demanded. Within each record, parts data are broken down by categories such as 
National Item Identification Number (NIIN), unit of issue, advice code, quantity 
requested, and price. This separation of parts data allows the LS to examine each 
category for accuracy and make the necessary changes.  
Tech Edit 
5. Tech edit is performed on all requisitions that failed parts screening. At this 
point, the LS utilizes several parts management software systems outside of RSupply to 
verify that every category of part data is correct. Any discrepancies overlooked can create 
defects resulting in an increase in price or greater quantity of parts ordered.  
Parts Cancelled 
6. Defects that cannot be corrected result in the cancellation of the requisitioned 
parts by the LS in Viking. If demand is still valid, the work center will have to re-submit 
the correct parts in OMMS. 
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G. Viking cancels the part(s) requisitioned associated with the work candidate and 
annotates that action in an electronic transaction log.  
Issue File 
H. Parts that are deemed to be correct or that have been corrected through the tech 
edit process are automatically screened against inventory onboard ship and placed in the 
issue file. 
Issue Document Printed   
I. If a part is onboard, a DD 1348–1A form prints from a dedicated printer located 
in the supply office.  
Stock Check  
7. Once a DD 1348–1A prints, LS personnel responsible for issuing DLRs will 
conduct a physical stock check to ensure the part is onboard. Once verified onboard, the 
LS will look up the advice code for the DLR part demanded to determine if a carcass 
turn-in is required at the time of exchange.  
Turn-In Required 
8. If the DLR requested is 5G, the work center is required to bring the NRFI 
carcass to the DLR custodian at the time of exchange. If the NRFI carcass is incorrect, 
the DLR custodian does not issue the ready-for-issue (RFI) part and the work center must 
locate the correct NRFI carcass. If the NRFI carcass is not available for turn-in, a RIP 
chit is required in the absence of the NRFI carcass to issue the RFI part.  
Part Pulled 
9. The DLR custodian retrieves the RFI DLR from the storeroom.  
 Part Issued 
10. The DLR custodian physically gives the RFI DLR to the work center. 
Work Center Receives Part   
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11. The work center signs and dates the DD1348–1A to confirm receipt of the 
RFI part. 
Posting 
12. The DLR custodian manually posts the issue into RSupply. 
 J. RSupply adjusts the SRF to reflect that the part was issued and ACWT stops. 
F. DATA 
To better define the problem of excessive ACWT, we collected data from two 
separate sources that capture DLR ACWT. NSLC and COMNAVSURFOR both track 
ACWT; however, they utilize separate guidance and databases to interpret the results.   
NSLC utilizes the OPNAVINST 4441.12D (Chief of Naval Operations, 2012) 
guidance which provides policy on how to manage Navy-owned inventories at Navy 
activities while applying performance goal metrics. Per this instruction, ACWT is 
calculated from parts demand created in OMMS to issuance of the part in RSupply. 
Performance measures are applied in the form of ACWT goals to indicate whether 
customer demands are being met in a timely manner. A “two-hour” ACWT goal is 
established for ships that have supply inventory onboard that is readily available to the 
work center. Per OPNAVINST 4441.12 (Chief of Naval Operations, 2012), the 
supporting activity, known as the supply department onboard ship, should be capable of 
issuing the part within a two-hour time block once the demand for parts is generated in 
OMMS.   
The database utilized by NSLC to capture ACWT is OARS. This program 
accesses OMMS to collect data, with a focus on maintenance and material repair. OARS 
captures data from demand created in OMMS, to issuance in RSupply, by extracting two 
separate date/time stamps; (1) ACWT begins at demand created, and (2) ACWT stops at 
issuance of part. Demand created is identified as the time the work center enters parts 
required for a work candidate in OMMS.   
COMNAVSURFOR utilizes COMNAVSURFORINST 4400.1 (Commander, 
Naval Surface Forces, 2008), which provides guidance on how to manage DLRs, while 
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applying a different set of performance metrics.   Per this instruction, ACWT is 
calculated from the time the request/requisition number is assigned in OMMS by 
RSupply to issuance of parts in RSupply.   
The database utilized by COMNAVSURFOR to capture ACWT is CMP. CMP 
captures this performance with three separate date/time stamps within RSupply: (1) tech 
edit, (2) approval, and (3) issue. These data are then measured against 
COMNAVSURFOR’s performance metric, which measures ACWT in days, rather than 
hours (Figure 13). A DLR requested and issued in two days or less is assessed as green. 
Likewise, a DLR requested and issued in more than two days, but fewer than three days 
is assessed as yellow. Lastly, a DLR requested and issued in three days or more is 
assessed as red. 
 
 CMP Stop Light Chart Figure 13. 
The sample size data we collected for analysis consisted of seven U.S. Navy 
Destroyers with BMD capability, stationed in the Pacific Fleet. We collected 12 months 
of OARS data, obtained through NSLC, consisting of 716 onboard DLR 
requests/requisitions dated from July 2011 through June 2012. We obtained 12 months of 
CMP data through COMNAVSURFOR consisting of 471 onboard DLR 
requests/requisitions dated from December 2011 through December 2012.  
As mentioned earlier, OARS and CMP data capture ACWT differently. Since 
CMP data only reflects ACWT from request/requisition to issuance in RSupply, we used 
OARS data because it provides a complete assessment of ACWT from demand created in 
OMMS to the issuance of parts in RSupply. We then analyzed each month of data and 
compared it to both corresponding performance metrics to identify potential defects 
contributing to excessive ACWT.   
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1. OARS DATA 
Based on our data, we analyzed 716 total DLR requests with ACWT ranging  
from a minimum of six minutes to a maximum of 2,036 hours (85 days). The average 
wait time, as seen in Figure 14, was 71 hours (three days) with a standard deviation of 
178.6 hours (7.4 days) for processing a DLR from demand to issue. 
 
 OARS Descriptive Statistics in Hours Figure 14. 
Next, we created line charts for each ship displaying the ACWT of DLR 
requests/requisitions broken down by month as seen in Figures 16–22. Figure 23 depicts 
total combined request/requisitions for all seven ships.   As visually depicted in the 
charts, the red line represents COMNAVSURFOR goals with an ACWT of less than 
72 hours (three days). The blue line represents OPNAV goals with an ACWT of less than 
two hours. Green triangles represent the ACWT for each month, while the error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals around the ACWT. Based on this information, we 
were able to calculate the percentage of defects that did not meet OPVNAV and 
COMNAVSURFOR goals. Defects are defined as any month in which ACWT was 




 Defect Rate Calculation Figure 15. 
Ship 1 data consist of 99 transactions with a defect rate of 100% for OPNAV 
goals and 25% for COMNAVSURFOR goals.  
 
 Ship 1  Figure 16. 
Ship 2 data consist of 115 transactions with a defect rate of 100% for OPNAV 
goals and 33% for COMNAVSURFOR goals.  
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 Ship 2 Figure 17. 
Ship 3 data consist of 69 transactions with a defect rate of 91% for OPNAV goals 
and 27% for COMNAVSURFOR goals.  
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  Ship 3 Figure 18. 
Ship 4 data consist of 159 transactions with a defect rate of 100% for OPNAV 
goals and 42% for COMNAVSURFOR goals.  
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 Ship 4 Figure 19. 
Ship 5 data consist of 120 transactions with a defect rate of 100% for OPNAV 
goals and 55% for COMNAVSURFOR goals.  
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 Ship 5 Figure 20. 
Ship 6 data consist of 55 transactions with a defect rate of 100% for OPNAV 
goals and 55% for COMNAVSURFOR goals. 
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 Ship 6 Figure 21. 
Ship 7 data consist of 99 transactions with a defect rate of 92% for OPNAV goals 
and 33% for COMNAVSURFOR goals. 
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 Ship 7 Figure 22. 
The combination of data for all seven ships consists of 716 total transactions with 
a defect rate of 100% for OPNAV goals and 42% for COMNAVSURFOR goals.  
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 Combined Data Figure 23. 
When comparing the combined data set of all seven ships to OPNAVINST 
4441.12D (Chief of Naval Operations, 2012), zero ships met the monthly mandatory 
“two-hour” performance metric which equates to a 100% defect rate.   When compared to 
COMNAVSURFORINST 4400.1 (Commander, Naval Surface Forces, 2008), five out of 
12 months violated the COMNAVSURFOR metric resulting in a defect rate of 42%. 
With the combined ships defect rate at 100%, the OPNAV metric appears unrealistic. 
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VI. ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 
A. OARS AND CMP MATCHING DATA 
Based on the feedback received from the fishbone diagram, we believe the 
priority placed on work candidate creation is causing a backlog in OMMS, thus 
increasing the ACWT. In addition, we believe work candidates that require outside 
technical assistance are causing an artificial inflation in ACWT calculation as well. With 
this in mind, we developed two hypotheses to possibly explain these assumptions. 
1. Hypothesis #1 
Defects are caused by a bottleneck in the DLR process that can be measured by 
combining OARS and CMP matching request/requisitions and comparing time-stamp 
data.  
During our research, we discovered limitations with both sets of OARS and CMP 
data. OARS data provide only two date-time stamps: (1) parts demand created in OMMS 
and (2) parts issued in RSupply. As a result, they do not reflect a date time stamp when 
the request/requisition transfers from OMMS into RSupply. This is considered a critical 
step because it is the first time the request/requisition becomes visible to the personnel 
capable of satisfying the demand. In other words, the personnel responsible for issuing 
the parts are unaware of any requirement although ACWT has already begun.   
Similar to OMMS, RSupply offers a limited view of ACWT as well. It does not 
take into account the time spent for parts data entry and approval of a work candidate by 
the department head in OMMS. RSupply provides three date time stamps: (1) tech edit, 
(2) approval, and (3) issue. In addition, the quantity of CMP data available may be 
limited based on the number of requests/requisitions uploaded by the ships. 
Based on the limitations of both OARS and CMP, we combined matching 
requests/requisitions from each data set to create a more accurate picture of the ACWT 
beginning in OMMS and ending in RSupply.    
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We analyzed 216 matching DLR requests/requisitions with ACWT ranging from 
a minimum of 12 minutes to a maximum of 85 days.   As seen in Figure 24, the average 
wait time was 3.7 days with a standard deviation of 10.9 days for processing a DLR from 
parts demand in OMMS to issuance of parts in RSupply.   
 
 Matching Data in Days Figure 24. 
By aligning OARS and CMP data sets with matching requests/requisitions, we 
were able to capture all four time stamps: (1) parts demand created in OMMS, (2) tech 
edit, (3) approval, and (4) issue in RSupply. As a result, we were able to achieve a 
complete picture of the ACWT. Figure 25 depicts the average amount of time spent at 
each date time stamp in both OMMS and RSupply for all 216 requests/requisitions. These 
time stamps include OMMS parts demand entry to work candidate approval, RSupply 
tech edit to approval, and RSupply approval to issue.   
The analysis revealed it took an average of 3.66 days to complete a transaction 
from demand entry to issuance of a DLR. Moreover, the largest amount of time spent in 
the process took place in OMMS, averaging 2.09 days, followed by RSupply approval to 
















the bottleneck resides in OMMS, lending strong support to our first hypothesis. As a 
result, initial efforts to reduce the ACWT should begin with a focus on OMMS-related 
activities. 
 
 Distribution of Average Customer Wait Time Figure 25. 
2. Hypothesis #2 
Defects are caused by a limited number of excessively large outliers that 
artificially inflate ACWT.  
For our second hypothesis, we utilized the same data in the first hypothesis to 
create two separate histograms showing the frequency of DLR request/requisitions 
broken down by the number of hours it took to issue them. Initially, we calculated the 
original data set without removing any outliers as seen in Figure 26. This resulted in a 
calculate mean of 82 hours and a standard deviation of 152 hours. Note that these 
statistics are for the entire set of matching data and are not specific to one particular ship 
or one particular month; this is different from the metric of ACWT which is specific to a 
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ship and a month. However, it established a baseline that we utilized to remove outliers 
that were greater than three standard deviations from the mean.   
 
 Original Matching OARS and CMP Data Figure 26. 
After seven outliers were removed, the statistics adjusted to a new mean of 42 
hours and a new standard deviation of 73 hours as seen in Figure 27. As a result of 
removing the seven outliers the mean was cut in half.  
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 Matching OARS and CMP Data Without Outliers Figure 27. 
Ideally, we wanted to show how the removal of outliers would affect the defect 
rate (percentage of ship/months not currently meeting ACWT standards), but based on a 
limited sample size of matching data, we were unable to calculate it (on average there 
was only 5 requests per ship per month). However, our results provided directional 
support for our second hypothesis; mainly, that with the removal of outliers the overall 
average (as opposed to ship/month averages) was reduced in half and the variance was 
significantly reduced. While the removal of the outliers improved the overall average and 
standard deviation, further analysis should be conducted to identify the root cause of long 
wait times for each outlier. Once these root causes are identified, another DMAIC 
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VII. IMPROVING AND CONTROLING THE PROBLEM 
A. INTRODUCTION TO IMPROVEMENTS 
Based on the DMIAC analysis we conducted, we believe there are numerous 
areas where efficiencies can be gained in terms of reducing ACWT through more 
efficient processes, training, and intrusive leadership.  
As outlined in the analysis chapter, the data set of matching requests for OMMS 
and RSupply revealed the largest total ACWT took place in OMMS, from demand entry 
to approval. This portion of time represents 57% of the total time from demand entry to 
issue of a DLR. This is clearly a bottleneck to the entire DLR issuing process and 
provides strong evidence that any efficiencies leveraged against this process should begin 
in OMMS.  
Additional focus areas include RSupply approval to issue, which represented 
34% of the ACWT. This is where we believe that ACWT becomes heavily influenced by 
human responsiveness rather than any computer-based requirements. As our qualitative 
analysis indicated, there is a cultural difference between those requesting parts and those 
satisfying the demand. Many work centers are not aware of the 2M requirements for 
repairing a bad part before requesting a replacement or the time requirements set forth by 
naval guidance for turning in a carcass. As a result, the level of training and 
accountability provided by shipboard leadership becomes a crucial part of reducing the 
ACWT. 
Based on these findings, we suggest the following recommendations to reduce the 
ACWT for issuing DLRs onboard ship. 
B. IMPROVEMENT #1 
Training should be conducted at all shipboard levels of authority concerning the 
importance of timely work candidate creation and DLR turn-in procedures. At the basis 
of any problem involving multiple levels of leadership, resides a minority of personnel 
conducting the majority of the work. As a result, only a select few personnel are aware of 
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the importance of adhering to standards, while the others subscribe to a “that’s the way 
it’s always been done” mentality. As a result, possible improvements to a process or 
strategy are sacrificed due in part to poor leadership or accountability. Therefore, we 
recommend that supply officers, as well as chief engineers, onboard surface combatants 
conduct training at the Wardroom level concerning the relationship between timely 
maintenance and proper DLR issuing procedures. This will create a top-down training 
initiative to eliminate a culture of division between work center and supply personnel, 
and establish a baseline for improving ACWT. Furthermore, strict accountability to these 
standards must be maintained and enforced by shipboard leadership.  
C. IMPROVEMENT #2 
Additional ACWT standards for OMMS and the maintenance side of the DLR 
request process should be established and measured. This will increase awareness of 
performance for work centers, as well as create accountability for work candidate 
creation, parts entry, and approval. Just like the matching data analysis we conducted in 
the previous chapter, time stamp data will quickly display any bottlenecks that require 
additional focus for improvement. Moreover, this should be promulgated Navy wide by 
incorporating a baseline standard, much like CMP, into the surface force readiness 
database called Training and Operational Readiness Information Services (TORIS). This 
will allow commanding officers to quickly identify any areas of weakness concerning 
readiness and to allocate resources or additional training towards improvement.  
D. IMPROVEMENT #3 
In addition to establishing accountability standards for ACWT in OMMS, we 
argue that third-party audits within RSupply should be performed by the ATG as well. 
Much like the quarterly audits the ATG currently performs when reviewing a ship’s 
government purchase card records, ACWT trends within RSupply could be examined to 
pinpoint any areas of weakness concerning the issuance of DLRs. This creates an 
additional layer of accountability for the supply personnel as well as reinforces the 
training component for reducing ACWT.  
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E. IMPROVEMENT #4 
ACWT performance data for onboard DLRs should be readily available 
within the CMP website. Currently, CMP programmers do not separate the ACWT for 
onboard issue of DLRs from consumable requests. As a result, poor performance 
concerning the issue of DLRs goes unnoticed with a larger number of consumable 
requests to offset the data. With such a strong correlation between a ship’s level of 
readiness and the ACWT for issuing DLRs, a simple software patch would reap 
immediate benefits. 
F. CONCLUSION 
To have the greatest effect, recommendations 1 through 3 should be executed in 
tandem rather than separately. As a result, they will strengthen one another providing 
good “fit” concerning operational effectiveness and promoting reduction of ACWT. 
Training to a minimum standard, holding sailors accountable for execution, and 
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